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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Uncertainty plays an important role in many areas of economic behaviour.  Three leading 
examples concern the effects of demand uncertainty on firms’ investment decisions, the 
effects of income uncertainty on household consumption and saving, and the effects of 
various kinds of uncertainty on monetary policy-making.  In most of these areas the literature 
contains not only theoretical models but also empirical analyses, where a basic requirement is 
the construction of relevant measures of uncertainty.  Direct measures are relatively rare; 
moreover typically “there is no consensus about the appropriate way to proxy uncertainty in 
an empirical formulation,” as Carruth et al. (2000, p.133) conclude in their review of the 
literature on investment under uncertainty.  There are exceptions, however, in particular in 
surveys that elicit expectations about future economic outcomes in the form of subjective 
probability distributions – so-called density forecasts.  Our purpose in this article is to 
introduce a new source of such data, relating to the United Kingdom, namely the Bank of 
England Survey of External Forecasters. 
 
 The best-known series of density forecasts in macroeconomics dates from 1968, when 
the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research jointly 
initiated a quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasters in the United States, known as the 
ASA-NBER survey; Zarnowitz (1969) describes its original objectives.  In 1990 the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia assumed responsibility for the survey, and changed its name to 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).  Survey respondents are asked not only to 
report their point forecasts of several variables but also to attach a probability to each of a 
number of pre-assigned intervals, or bins, into which output growth and inflation, this year 
and next year, might fall.  In this way, respondents provide density forecasts of these two 
variables, in the form of histograms.  The probabilities are then averaged over respondents to 
obtain the mean or combined density forecasts, again in the form of histograms, and these are 
included in the quarterly publication of forecasts.  Similar questions about inflation have been 
asked in the Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters (SEF) since 1996, and about 
GDP growth since 1998; the combined density forecasts likewise feature in the Bank’s 
quarterly Inflation Report. 
 
 The individual responses to the US survey, suitably anonymised, and with a short 
delay, have been made available for research purposes, in accordance with one of the 
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survey’s original objectives, to construct an archive that would support scientific study.  The 
resulting literature includes studies of the relationship between direct measures of uncertainty 
based on density forecasts, and disagreement among point forecasts, by Zarnowitz and 
Lambros (1987), updated and extended by Giordani and Soderlind (2003) and Rich and Tracy 
(2006); the relationship between inflation uncertainty and real interest rates (Lahiri, Teigland 
and Zaporowski, 1988; Batchelor and Dua, 1996), the latter authors also comparing the direct 
measure of inflation uncertainty with various proxies used in empirical studies; and the 
relationship between uncertainty and the equity premium puzzle in the consumption-based 
asset pricing model (Giordani and Soderlind, 2006).  Recently the Bank of England has 
likewise agreed to make available the anonymised individual SEF responses, and a first 
analysis of these is presented in this article.  We look forward to a similarly wide range of 
applications based on UK data in due course, although the available time series are as yet 
relatively short. 
 
 Further studies of uncertainty that use direct measures based on density forecasts 
reported by survey respondents can be found at the micro level, usually as a result of adding a 
special question on a particular occasion to an ongoing large-scale sample survey of 
households or firms.  Thus Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) test for the presence of 
precautionary saving using a measure of uncertainty based on households’ density forecasts 
of their earnings, and Guiso and Parigi (1999) investigate the effects of uncertainty on 
investment decisions using a measure based on firms’ density forecasts of the demand for 
their product.  In both cases the data source is a one-off question included in an annual Bank 
of Italy survey.  Similar studies of household income expectations can be found in the United 
States (Dominitz and Manski, 1997) and the Netherlands (Das and Donkers, 1999).  These 
articles contain a good discussion of the reliability of subjective distributions of individuals’ 
prospects, facing the objection that people have no incentive to answer the questions 
carefully, nor indeed the requisite ability; see also the survey by Manski (2004).  
Nevertheless Batchelor (2007) argues that models from the earnings forecasting literature are 
of little relevance to macroeconomic forecasters.  The SEF respondents are professional 
economists, regularly providing forecasts and analysis to economic and financial decision 
makers, and users rely on their professionalism and experience in supplying careful answers. 
 
 The remainder of this article is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides general 
information about the survey and the dataset of individual responses.  Section 3 presents 
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some possible direct measures of uncertainty and disagreement, and the results of 
implementing our preferred measures in this dataset.  Comparisons of these measures with 
other direct measures of uncertainty, nationally and internationally, are presented in Section 
4.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. THE BANK OF ENGLAND SURVEY OF EXTERNAL FORECASTERS 
 
Every quarter, the Bank of England asks a group of external forecasters for their views on 
inflation, output growth, interest rates and the sterling exchange rate.  The institutions 
covered in the sample include City firms, academic institutions and private consultancies, and 
are predominantly based in London.  The sample changes from time to time as old 
respondents leave or new survey members are included, and not every institution provides a 
forecast to the Bank every quarter.  There is no record of the response rate, and only one 
institution is ever-present.  The survey is carried out just before each quarterly Inflation 
Report, which then presents a summary of the results, usually in a box.  Each chart or table 
includes a note of the number of responses on which it is based, and it can be seen that not all 
respondents answer every question.  The Inflation Report is published each February, May, 
August and November, and we refer to individual surveys by these dates, although the 
questionnaires are sent out during the preceding month. 
 
 From its first appearance in February 1993 the Inflation Report included information 
on the point forecasts of inflation made by outside forecasters, variously described as “other 
inflation projections”, “private sector inflation forecasts” and so forth.  In February 1996, for 
the first time, the Bank itself asked the forecasters not only about their central projections for 
inflation but also about the probabilities they attach to various possible inflation outcomes.  
Inflation was defined with respect to the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest 
payments (RPIX), in terms of which the official inflation target was defined; the survey 
definition switched to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) from the February 2004 survey, 
following the change in the Bank’s official targeted measure in December 2003.  Questions 
about point and density forecasts of GDP growth have appeared since February 1998, and 
about point forecasts of the official interest rate and the sterling exchange rate index since 
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November 1999.  Given our focus on density forecasts these last two variables are not 
considered in the present article. 
 
The density forecast questions divide the range of each variable into a number of bins, 
which has varied between four and six.  For annual inflation (percent), initially five bins were 
specified (<1, 1-2.5, 2.5-4, 4-5.5, >5.5), from February 1998 reduced to four (<1.5, 1.5-2.5, 
2.5-3.5, >3.5), finally from May 1999 increased to six (<1.5, 1.5-2, 2-2.5, 2.5-3, 3-3.5, >3.5), 
each change reducing the width of the interior intervals.  From February 2004 the whole grid 
was shifted downwards by 0.5, following the switch from the RPIX to the CPI inflation 
measure.  For GDP growth, six bins (<0, 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, >4) were specified until May 
2003, whereupon they were reduced to four by combining each pair of outer bins (<1, 1-2, 2-
3, >3). 
 
The dataset of individual SEF responses made available by the Bank covers 39 
surveys, beginning with the May 1996 survey and continuing to November 2005.  Each 
respondent has an identification number, so that their individual responses can be tracked 
over time and their point and density forecasts can be matched.  The number of forecasters 
providing at least one density forecast in a given survey ranges between 23 and 38, and is 
mostly in the upper twenties. 
 
 Each quarterly survey since February 1998 asks for forecasts at three future points in 
time: the fourth quarter (Q4) of the current year; the fourth quarter of the following year; and 
the corresponding quarter two years ahead.  (For the first seven surveys in the dataset, which 
relate only to inflation, only the first two questions appear.)  This structure eventually 
delivers nine successive forecasts of a given Q4 outcome, which can be treated as “fixed-
event” forecasts, with the date of the forecast preceding the date of the outcome by 8,7,…,1,0 
quarters.  Given that the survey goes out early in the quarter, when no data on current-quarter 
inflation and growth are available, we treat these as h-step-ahead forecasts with horizon h 
equal to 9, 8,…, 2, 1 quarters successively.  For time series of “fixed-horizon” forecasts, the 
third question delivers a quarterly series of nine-quarter-ahead forecasts, but the first two 
questions give only one observation per year at intermediate horizons, 4h =  and 8 in 
February, 3h =  and 7 in May, and so on.  This end-year focus is clearly more familiar to 
forecasters, since there are usually a few respondents who provide probability distributions in 
answer to the first two questions but not to the third question. 
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In over five thousand individual densities, there are nine in which the reported 
probabilities, with allowance for rounding, do not sum to 100%.  Three contain fairly obvious 
typographical errors, which we have corrected.  In the remaining six cases the total 
probability differs from 100% by no more than 10%; here we have amended one or two 
entries, with reference to the respondent’s other densities reported at the same time and 
densities reported for the same outcome in adjacent surveys.  These investigations uncovered 
two further inconsistencies which have also been corrected.  A note detailing these 
amendments to the dataset is available on request. 
 
 
 
3. MEASURES OF UNCERTAINTY AND DISAGREEMENT 
 
The published SEF results include the distribution of point forecasts, in the form of a 
histogram, and the aggregate or mean density forecasts, in tabular form.  We first present a 
simple statistical framework in which to introduce, and interrelate, direct measures of 
uncertainty and disagreement, respectively identified as measures of the dispersion of the 
forecast densities and the distribution of point forecasts (see Wallis, 2005, for fuller 
discussion and references to precursors).  Next, some practical considerations in calculating 
these measures are discussed.  Results are then presented, based in turn on the survey 
sequence and the fixed-event and fixed-horizon schemes discussed above; the standard error 
of our preferred measure of collective uncertainty is also reported. 
 
3.1 The statistical framework 
Denote n individual density forecasts of a random variable Y at some future time as ( )if y , 
1,..., .i n=   In the SEF these are expressed numerically, but the statistical framework also 
accommodates density forecasts that are expressed analytically, for example, via the normal 
or two-piece normal distributions.  For economy of notation time subscripts and references to 
the information sets on which the forecasts are conditioned are suppressed.  The published 
average or aggregate density forecast is then  
( ) ( )
1
1 n
A i
i
f y f y
n =
= ∑ .       (1) 
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From a statistical point of view, this is an example of a finite mixture distribution.  The 
moments about the origin of ( )Af y  are given as the corresponding equally-weighted 
combinations of the moments about the origin of the individual densities.  We assume that the 
individual point forecasts are the means of the individual forecast densities and so denote 
these means as ˆiy ; the individual variances are 
2
iσ .  Then the mean of the aggregate density 
is 
1
1
1 ˆ ˆ
n
i A
i
y y
n
μ
=
′ = =∑ ,       (2) 
namely the average point forecast, and the second moment about the origin is 
( )2 22
1
1 ˆ
n
i i
i
y
n
μ σ
=
′ = +∑ . 
Hence the variance of Af  is 
( )22 2 22 1
1 1
1 1 ˆ ˆ
n n
A i i A
i i
y y
n n
σ μ μ σ
= =
′ ′= − = + −∑ ∑ .    (3) 
This expression decomposes the variance of the aggregate density, 2Aσ , a possible measure of 
uncertainty, into the average individual uncertainty or variance, plus a measure of the 
dispersion of, or disagreement between, the individual point forecasts.  It shows that the 
disagreement measure, often suggested as a proxy variable for uncertainty in the absence of a 
direct measure, is indeed a component of the variance of the aggregate density forecast. 
 
 For a measure of collective uncertainty, the general approach in the SPF literature is 
to choose a measure of average individual uncertainty, rather than a measure based on the 
aggregate distribution, since the former is free of the influence of disagreement about point 
forecasts.  This is implicit in the work of Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), who use the 
average individual standard deviation and the standard deviation of point forecasts as their 
respective measures of uncertainty and disagreement.  The use of standard deviations rather 
than variances breaks equation (3), although Zarnowitz and Lambros seem unaware of this 
decomposition of the variance of the aggregate distribution.  Giordani and Soderlind (2003) 
follow suit, explicitly arguing against the use of the aggregate distribution, whose standard 
deviation they nevertheless calculate for comparative purposes.  In general it is more 
informative to present standard deviations, not variances, since their units coincide with the 
units of the variable under consideration, percentage points of inflation or GDP growth.  
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However our preferred measure of collective uncertainty is then defined as the square root of 
the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3), and not as the average individual 
standard deviation.  Batchelor and Dua (1996) call the preferred measure the root mean 
subjective variance (RMSV), and note that it is more consistent with an assumption of 
quadratic utility than the average standard deviation.  Denoting the average individual 
variance, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3), as 2σ : 
  2 2
1
1 n
i
in
σ σ
=
= ∑ ,        (4) 
the RMSV is its square root, 
  2RMSV σ= .       (5) 
An implication of equation (3) is that, given the variance of the aggregate density and the 
disagreement measure, an implied RMSV can be calculated as the square root of their 
difference, without calculating the variance of each individual forecast density. 
 
3.2 Some practical considerations 
Estimating moments from histograms   A first question is how to estimate means and 
variances from histograms, which in the SEF data have rather few bins, between four and six, 
with the first and last being open-ended.  A simple approach, referred to by several authors as 
providing “crude” estimates, is to apply standard formulae assuming that the reported 
probabilities are concentrated at the mid-points of the respective intervals, and that the open 
intervals have an assumed finite width.  An alternative assumption is that the reported 
probabilities are spread uniformly across each bin, which has no effect on the calculated 
mean but increases the variance by one-twelfth of the squared bin width.  Such a correction 
would apply equally to the aggregate variance and the average individual variance appearing 
in equation (3).  However Giordani and Soderlind (2003) note that the SPF histograms “often 
look fairly bell shaped” and so find it more reasonable to assume that more of the probability 
mass within an interval is located closer to the overall mean, which leads them to estimate 
means and variances by fitting normal distributions to the histograms. 
 
 For a histogram with k intervals, denote the upper boundaries of the first 1k −  
intervals as ,  1,..., 1jb j k= − , and the cumulative probabilities at these boundaries as 
,  1,..., 1j j kθ = − .  Assume that the first and last intervals have non-zero probability, so that 
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1 0θ >  and 1 1kθ − < .  If the distribution were normal, then the standardised boundaries would 
be the corresponding quantiles of the standard normal distribution, that is, 
  ,   1,..., 1jj
b
j k
μθ σ
−⎛ ⎞= Φ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
where ( )Φ ⋅  is the standard normal distribution function.  This suggests estimating the mean 
and standard deviation by the corresponding non-linear least squares regression of the 
cumulative probabilities on the interval boundaries.  However in the SEF data the aggregate 
distributions typically look quite normal, and the time series of variances estimated by the 
crude method and the normal approximation are virtually indistinguishable from one another, 
hence in practice we choose to retain the simpler method.  The individual density forecasts 
differ considerably in their dispersion, and present a problem for the normal approximation 
when forecasters assign zero probability to the outer intervals, as often occurs in the dataset.  
At first sight this might appear to be an estimation problem, since there may be inadequate 
degrees of freedom in the above non-linear regression, but more fundamentally the 
assumption of a normal distribution is inconsistent with the specification of a finite range for 
the forecast density.  When some forecasters further assign non-zero probability to only two 
intervals, the minimum observed in the dataset, individual variance calculations by any 
method become less reliable, and we avoid these difficulties by using the implied RMSV as 
our measure of average individual uncertainty in what follows, with the exception of Section 
3.6 below. 
 
 Our assumption about the open-ended intervals is that they have twice the width of 
the interior intervals, following Batchelor and Dua (1996).  Whereas the crude calculation of 
variances is generally insensitive to assumptions about the width of the open-ended bins, 
because their reported probabilities are small, on two occasions in the sample period, 
associated with a reduction in the number of bins, this condition does not apply.  The more 
prominent concerns the reduction in the number of histogram bins for GDP growth from six 
to four in May 2003.  As noted above, this was achieved by combining the outer, open-ended 
bins with their nearest neighbours, leaving only two interior bins.  In the aggregate density 
for question 3, the last two bins in February 2003 (3-4, >4%) have a combined probability of 
26%, while in May 2003 the single, newly combined upper bin (>3%) has a probability of 
22%.  At the individual level, 17 of the 22 reported densities in February 2003 have non-zero 
probabilities that growth will exceed 4%, with four responses of 15% or greater, while in 
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May 2003 none of the 23 reported densities give zero probability to the possibility that 
growth will exceed 3%, indeed there are four responses of 40% or greater.  If a unit width is 
assumed for the upper interval, and weights of this order of magnitude are placed on mid-
points of 3.5 and 4.5, separately, in February, and on 3.5 in total in May, then a spurious 
reduction in uncertainty is observed.  Our preferred double-width assumption implies 
corresponding mid-points of 3.5 and 5.0 in February, and 4.0 in May, which results in series 
without an obvious break at this point, and in which we have greater confidence throughout. 
 
Measures of disagreement   The measure defined by the square root of the last term in 
equation (3) is a measure of disagreement among individual density forecast means, whereas 
the variable that is relevant to the question of the usefulness or otherwise of disagreement as a 
proxy for an unavailable direct measure of uncertainty is the reported point forecast.  The 
notation used above assumes that these coincide, although we observe differences between 
point forecasts and density forecast means in the SEF dataset.  The optimal point forecast 
under a quadratic loss function is the mean of the density forecast, but differs from the mean 
under other symmetric loss functions – linear, or bounded, for example – if the density is 
asymmetric.  And if the loss function is asymmetric, again the optimal point forecast differs 
from the density forecast mean.  For the US SPF data, 1992-2004, Engelberg, Manski and 
Williams (2006) document the extent to which reported point forecasts deviate from 
calculated measures of central tendency (mean/median/mode).  They observe that in such 
cases forecasters are inclined to present favourable scenarios, in the sense that, more often 
than not, their point forecasts anticipate lower inflation and higher output growth than 
indicated by the central tendencies of their density forecasts.  For the SEF data, some 
summary evidence is given in Table 1, which reports the percentage of cases in which the 
point forecast deviates from the density forecast mean by more than 0.2 percentage points.  It 
is seen that there is a greater tendency towards “favourable” scenarios in respect of GDP 
growth than inflation, and that this increases as the forecast horizon increases.  However in 
the two-year-ahead inflation forecasts the deviations are almost evenly balanced, suggesting 
that, in an inflation targeting regime, a favourable scenario is one in which the official target 
is achieved in the medium term, and this may lead to a positive or negative adjustment to an 
initial forecast.  A fuller analysis of the point forecasts is given by Boero, Smith and Wallis 
(2006). 
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For our statistical measure of disagreement, using either variable, we follow Giordani 
and Soderlind (2003) and choose a measure that is robust to outliers, specifically the quasi-
standard deviation (qsd), equal to half the difference between the 16th and 84th percentiles of 
the sample of point forecasts or density forecast means, appropriately interpolated.  With 
normally distributed data this calculation delivers the standard deviation; in the SEF data it 
prevents the measure being overly sensitive to extreme observations, which may be mistakes, 
on two or three occasions.  As an example we use the responses to question 1 of the survey, 
and plot the qsds of the point forecasts and the density forecast means for inflation and GDP 
growth in the two panels of Figure 1.  There appear to be no statistical reasons to prefer one 
series to the other, and in the remainder of this article we use the qsd of the point forecasts as 
our measure of disagreement, since these are the forecasts that are relevant to the proxy 
variable question, as discussed above. 
 
3.3 Uncertainty and disagreement, question-by-question 
Each Inflation Report presents aggregate results for the current survey, but only very 
occasionally includes consideration of these in relation to previous surveys.  We first present 
time series of survey results by question, in effect time series of Inflation Report boxes.  The 
six panels of Figure 2 present, for each of the three questions and two variables in turn, the 
aggregate standard deviation, Aσ , the average individual uncertainty, implied RMSV, and the 
qsd measure of disagreement among point forecasts. 
 
 It is seen that the uncertainty measures obtained from the responses to the first 
question show strong annual periodicity, but this is less pronounced in question 2 and absent 
in question 3.  This reflects the variation in forecast horizon across the four surveys each 
year, which is successively 4, 3, 2, 1, 4, 3, 2, 1, … quarters for question 1, and 8, 7, 6, 5, 8, 7, 
6, 5, … quarters for question 2, but constant at 9 quarters for question 3.  The relative 
amplitude of the periodic fluctuations reflects the behaviour of the mean square forecast error 
for a relevant time series model, such as a first-order autoregression, which falls much less 
between 8- and 5-quarter-ahead forecasts than between 4- and 1-quarter ahead forecasts.  
This pattern of decline is emphasised when we consider fixed-event forecasting schemes 
below.  The disagreement series for question 1 show evidence of similar periodicity but with 
a smaller amplitude than the uncertainty series, and for inflation this appears only in the first 
part of the sample period. 
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The major change in the general level of the inflation uncertainty series that catches 
the eye is the reduction in uncertainty in the early part of the sample period, until the May 
1999 survey, after which the general level is approximately constant.  We test for a structural 
break in the series using Andrews’ (1993) sup-Wald statistic, treating the break point as 
unknown, with approximate asymptotic p-values obtained as described by Hansen (1997).  
For the first two questions this shows that a significant break, at the 5% level, can be dated at 
any time between February 1998 and November 1999 for the aggregate standard deviation 
and average individual uncertainty (implied RMSV) series.  The third question did not appear 
until February 1998, and there are insufficient observations to apply a formal test in the early 
part of the series, nevertheless the aggregate and average individual uncertainty series both 
show a prominent fall in May 1999.  There may have been some initial learning about how to 
answer the probability questions on the part of the forecasters, but we attribute these 
reductions in uncertainty about future inflation to the increasing confidence in, and credibility 
of, the new monetary policy arrangements.  The operational independence of the Bank of 
England was announced within days of the change of government in the 1 May 1997 general 
election, and the newly-established Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) first met on 5-6 June 
1997.  (The committee is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England and has eight other 
members, of whom four are senior Bank staff and four are externally appointed.)  Market-
based measures of inflation expectations fell sharply following the announcement of the new 
monetary policy arrangements, and continued to fall, reaching a level slightly under the 
Bank’s official target of 2.5% in late 1998.  Our measures of uncertainty provide further 
evidence of the rapid gains in monetary policy credibility over this period. 
 
 Application of the formal tests to the GDP growth uncertainty series shows no 
equivalent structural breaks, although the series have a tendency to decline towards the end of 
the sample period.  In the first seven surveys the two inflation disagreement series are at a 
significantly higher level than subsequently, with a local peak in February 1997, but from 
February 1998, when the third inflation question and the GDP growth questions first 
appeared, none of the disagreement series shows any systematic variation. 
 
3.4 Fixed-event forecasts 
We use the fixed-event scheme to study the effect of forecast horizon on uncertainty and 
disagreement.  Except for the first two years of the dataset, there are nine successive forecasts 
of each Q4 outcome, as noted above.  For example, for the 2001Q4 outcomes, the first (nine-
 12
step-ahead) forecasts are given in response to question 3 in the November 1999 survey, then 
8, 7, 6, and 5-step-ahead forecasts are given in response to question 2 in the four successive 
surveys in 2000, finally 4, 3, 2 and 1-step-ahead forecasts in the four 2001 surveys.  We 
reassemble comparable information from the three panels of Figure 2, and present it as 
separate trajectories for selected Q4 target outcomes in Figure 3.  Of the nine available Q4 
inflation outcomes, 1997-2005, and the seven available Q4 GDP growth outcomes, 1999-
2005, in each case we omit three (2001-03) to avoid overloading the figure.  The implied 
RMSV measure of uncertainty is shown in the upper panels, and the qsd of the reported point 
forecasts is shown in the lower panels. 
 
 Looking first at the inflation panels of Figure 3, we note that the earliest trajectory, for 
the 1997Q4 outcome, starts, with the dataset, in May 1996, at 7h = , while the next two start 
at 8h = , since there was no question 3 in the November 1996 and 1997 surveys.  Beginning 
with the average individual uncertainty measures (upper left panel), the first two trajectories 
show substantially higher levels of inflation uncertainty, with the second, 1998Q4, trajectory 
falling dramatically between November 1997 and February 1998.  The next two show less 
dramatic reductions from their initial levels, and from May 1999 onwards the plots are 
remarkably close to one another.  This is an alternative presentation of the rapid gains in 
monetary policy credibility described above.  The two recent trajectories (and the three not 
shown) are very similar, and show a steady decline in uncertainty as the forecast horizon is 
reduced, as described for various models in forecasting textbooks.  For these five, the average 
individual uncertainty measure is reduced from approximately 0.7 percentage points at 9h =  
to 0.4 at 1h = .  In time-series forecasting, the reduction in forecast mean square error 
between long-horizon and short-horizon forecasts is greater the more persistent is the series, 
and the reduction observed here is greater than that implied by the persistence of inflation 
over this period.  The degree of persistence of UK inflation has been falling in recent years, 
perhaps to a greater extent than forecasters have recognised. 
 
 Disagreement measures scarcely feature in forecasting textbooks, however, and there 
are some similarities and some differences between the two inflation panels.  The first two 
disagreement trajectories, like their uncertainty counterparts, start high and then decline, 
although the later ones are rather flatter.  Nevertheless in all nine cases there is more 
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disagreement at the beginning ( 9h =  or slightly less) than at the end ( 1h = ), but in no case is 
the decline monotonic. 
 
 The GDP growth forecasts begin in 1998 and do not exhibit the early reductions in 
uncertainty associated in the inflation forecasts with the gaining of monetary policy 
credibility.  Relatively steady reductions in uncertainty are observed across the fixed-event 
forecasts.  Uncertainty in growth is at a higher level than in inflation, however, and its 
dispersion across the various fixed-event forecasts is greater than in the more recent fixed-
event inflation forecasts.  Disagreement in the growth forecasts is similarly higher and noisier 
than in the inflation forecasts, although the same general tendency, of a reduction in 
disagreement as the forecast horizon reduces, is observed. 
 
3.5 Fixed-horizon series 
Fixed-horizon time series are free of the effects of varying lead time but, as noted above, 
quarterly series are available only for 9h = ; at each intermediate horizon, 1,...,8,h =  only an 
annual series is available, for each variable.  Nevertheless this is the most appropriate format 
in which to compare the SEF measures with direct measures from other sources, which is the 
subject of the next section. 
 
 Correlation analysis of the quarterly constant-horizon series (at 9h = ) shows that 
disagreement is not a good proxy for collective uncertainty.  Over the available period, 
1998Q1-2005Q4, the correlation between the RMSV uncertainty series and the qsd 
disagreement series shown in the bottom panels of Figure 2 is 0.03 for inflation and 0.11−  
for GDP growth.  In an attempt to obtain comparable sample sizes at shorter horizons we 
“deseasonalise” the data from questions 1 and 2 by dummy variable regression, to correct for 
variation in forecast horizon within each series shown in the top and middle panels of Figure 
2.  For inflation, over the full period 1996Q2-2005Q4, we then obtain much higher 
correlations: 0.63 for question 1 and 0.86 for question 2.  It is clear from the figure that these 
results are driven by the initial observations in each series, covering the “pre-credibility” and 
“learning” periods, but also when the very early observations seem less reliable: from 
1999Q2 the correlations become 0.02 and 0.08−  respectively.  For GDP growth, over the full 
period used above, we again obtain negative correlations, namely 0.28−  for the adjusted 
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question 1 series and 0.18−  likewise for question 2.  These results show that, at least over 
this period, disagreement is not a good proxy for uncertainty. 
 
 In relation to the US literature, we note that earlier results more favourable to the 
proxy variable view were based on much more turbulent experience, going back as far as 
1968.  Our sample period is shorter and much more stable: RPIX inflation has varied between 
1.9% and 3.2%, and GDP growth between 0.7% and 3.95% (quarterly observations on annual 
rates) over the ten years of the SEF dataset.  At the same time, however, we note that recent 
research on the SPF data that brings the sample period up to date and studies the robustness 
of previous findings to the choice of measures finds less support than hitherto for the 
proposition that disagreement is a useful proxy for uncertainty (Lahiri and Liu, 2006; Rich 
and Tracy, 2006). 
 
3.6 Disagreement about uncertainty 
The individual forecast histograms represent a considerable spread of opinion, as noted 
above, indicating a lack of agreement about forecast uncertainty among the sample of 
forecasters.  This is illustrated by the example in the upper panel of Figure 4, which shows 
the 21 individual inflation histograms at 9h =  reported in the November 2005 survey.  These 
are ordered by their individual dispersion, which reduces as we move from the front to the 
back of the array.  Some histograms towards the front are distorted by the replacement of the 
open-ended intervals by closed intervals: for this purpose, though not for our computations, 
as noted above, these are drawn with the same width as the interior intervals.  Clearly the first 
forecast density shown has tails extending well beyond the range used in this illustration.  
Towards the back of the array there are a few responses with non-zero probability in only two 
interior intervals.  (Corresponding variation in the dispersion of the SPF individual forecast 
histograms is represented by Lahiri and Liu (2006) as a box-and-whisker plot of their 
variances.) 
 
To summarise the impact of this sample variation on our collective uncertainty 
measure, RMSV, as defined in equation (5), we calculate its standard error under the 
conventional random sampling assumption.  Using the standard expression for the variance of 
the sample mean, and taking account of the square root transformation, the standard error of 
RMSV is obtained as 
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Again using an inflation example, we plot a band of two standard errors on either side of the 
RMSV estimate in the lower panel of Figure 4, which refers to the quarterly constant-horizon 
series at 9h = .  (This does not exactly correspond to the series shown in the lower left panel 
of Figure 2, since for the present purpose we need to calculate the variances of the individual 
forecast histograms, and hence on this occasion we report the direct RMSV as given explicitly 
by equation (5)).  It is seen that taking account of sampling variation in this way strengthens 
the conclusion that inflation uncertainty has fluctuated randomly around a constant level once 
credibility of the new monetary policy regime had been achieved. 
 
 
 
4. COMPARISONS WITH MEASURES FROM OTHER SOURCES 
 
4.1 The Monetary Policy Committee’s forecasts 
Each quarterly Inflation Report includes the famous fan charts for inflation and GDP growth, 
representing the MPC’s density forecasts up to two years ahead.  (GDP growth forecasts first 
appeared in November 1997; the horizon for both variables was extended to three years in 
August 2004.)  Numerical information used in the construction of the distributions described 
by the fan charts is published on the Bank of England website 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/irprobab.htm).  It includes an 
uncertainty measure defined as the “input” standard deviation of the distribution.  We treat 
this measure, agreed by the MPC, as the average individual uncertainty across the nine-
member committee, and compare it to the average individual uncertainty, implied RMSV, in 
the SEF.  Comparisons are made at three forecast horizons, 1,5,9h = , since these forecasts, 
current-quarter, one-year-ahead and two-years-ahead, appear to be the ones that receive most 
public attention.  Results for inflation and GDP growth are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 The overall level of external forecasters’ uncertainty is higher than that of the MPC at 
shorter horizons, while the time series plots at 9h =  intermingle, for both variables.  The 
general practice of the MPC is first to calibrate the fan charts with reference to forecast errors 
over the previous ten years, and then to discuss whether current circumstances call for 
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adjustments.  Some recent examples of adjustments for which the MPC has given reasons are 
visible in Figure 5.  First, in the top left panel, the increase in November 2001 was attributed 
to “volatile short-term movements in inflation from month to month”, despite the fact that the 
fan charts relate to average inflation over the three months of each quarter; it has no 
counterpart in the lower panels.  Second, in February 2003, all panels of the figure show an 
increase that reflected the uncertainties associated with the war in Iraq, while it was judged 
that the exceptional uncertainty had dispersed by August 2003.  Finally, the exceptional step 
in the top right panel of Figure 5 in August 2005, increasing the standard deviation of the 
GDP growth forecast at 1h =  to almost the same value as that at 5h = (centre right panel), 
followed recognition of the uncertainty attached to recently-published national accounts data 
and the impact of data revisions on forecast errors.  Perhaps the external forecasters were 
already aware of this effect; overall, none of the above adjustments are reflected in the SEF 
uncertainty measures.  Noticeable more generally at the longer horizons is the tendency for 
the SEF plots to remain constant, after the initial reductions, while the MPC plots gradually 
decline, as the calibration window moves away from the earlier, more turbulent experience.  
The correlations between the two series at 9h =  are 0.70 for the inflation forecasts and 0.49 
for GDP growth. 
 
 Independent evaluations of the MPC’s inflation density forecasts at one and five-
quarter horizons against inflation outcomes up to the end of 2003 find that forecast 
uncertainty was overestimated (Clements, 2004; Wallis, 2004).  The MPC had correctly 
reduced the standard deviation of the fan chart at 5h =  from the high levels set initially, but 
had underestimated the required reduction, while the increase in November 2001 at 1h = was 
a step in the wrong direction.  The SEF uncertainty measures shown in Figure 5 suggest that 
the same conclusion will emerge more strongly when these forecasts face the same tests.  
Finally we note that the relative positions of the time series plots at 1h =  and 9h =  suggest 
that the MPC views inflation as being more persistent than viewed by the external 
forecasters. 
 
4.2 The US Survey of Professional Forecasters 
An international comparison can be based on the two existing survey datasets that include 
density forecasts, namely the SEF and the SPF.  For this purpose we use the SPF data 
reported by Giordani and Soderlind (2003, Fig.5), kindly updated by the second-named 
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author, and calculate the implied RMSV measure of collective uncertainty.  The SPF 
questions have an end-year focus, corresponding to questions 1 and 2 of the SEF, although 
the SPF asks about year-on-year growth rates, whereas the SEF asks about the Q4 annual 
growth rates.  Like many other SPF researchers, Giordani and Soderlind concentrate on the 
first-quarter surveys, hence results are available at horizons 4h =  and 8h = .  Corresponding 
SEF data on uncertainty and disagreement are extracted from Figure 2 above, and 
comparisons of the two surveys, based on the same measures for inflation and growth at these 
two horizons, are shown in the four panels of Figure 6. 
 
 The results for inflation at both horizons show that, after the initial credibility-gaining 
period, UK uncertainty and disagreement are below the US levels.  They provide further 
evidence that “inflation targeting has helped to confer tangible benefits,” as argued by the 
Governor of the Bank of England in his 2005 Mais lecture (King, 2005).  He cites the falling 
volatility of expected UK nominal short rates over this period, compared to its relative 
stability in the US, as evidence that inflation expectations are better anchored under inflation 
targeting, and our evidence makes the same point more directly.  The US inflation uncertainty 
series are nevertheless relatively stable, possibly reflecting the credibility of the Greenspan 
policy regime over the whole of this period.  We expect to see little evidence of short-lived 
turbulent episodes in an annual series, unless they coincide with the timing of observations.  
The most dramatic such episode in this period was the financial crisis of August-September 
1998 − the Russian bond default and the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), a US hedge fund − and the Federal Reserve’s aggressive policy response appears to 
have stabilised short-term inflation expectations by the time of the next survey, at the turn of 
the year. 
 
The two countries’ GDP growth uncertainty measures are broadly similar, irrespective 
of differences in their monetary policy regimes and somewhat different macroeconomic 
experience, the US recession of March-November 2001 having had no counterpart in the UK.  
The most prominent feature in the US GDP forecast data is the peak in disagreement in early 
2002.  This may reflect a wide dispersion of views about the short-term effects on the real 
economy of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, or the prospects for recovery from 
recession, the November 2001 turning point not having been announced by the NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee until July 2003. 
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The disagreement measures for the UK survey in general lie below their US 
counterparts, suggesting that the SEF forecasters are more homogeneous than the SPF 
forecasters.  It is certainly the case that the SPF sample is much more widely dispersed, 
across a much larger country, than the SEF sample.  Although modern communications 
technology can be expected to offset any simple location effects, there may also be some City 
of London “herd” effects in the SEF data. 
 
4.3 Option-implied probability density functions 
A source of direct measures of uncertainty about future asset prices is the prices of contracts 
traded in options markets.  Given a sufficiently active market, option-implied probability 
density functions – in effect, density forecasts – can be derived under an assumption of risk-
neutrality, and measures of their dispersion reflect the uncertainty of option market 
participants about future equity index and interest rate outcomes.  These are estimated on a 
daily basis by the Monetary Instruments and Markets Division of the Bank of England, using 
methods described by Clews, Panigirtzoglou and Proudman (2000), who use the standard 
deviation of the implied probability density function of the short-term interest rate, six 
months ahead, 1997-99, for illustrative purposes (Chart 9).  A fan chart describing financial 
market participants’ uncertainty about future interest rates, based on these data, appears in the 
Bank’s Inflation Report. 
 
 For comparative purposes the corresponding daily series for the short-term interest 
rate, three, six and twelve months ahead, are plotted in Figure 7, together with the “question 
1” RMSV measure of collective inflation uncertainty taken from the top left panel of Figure 2.  
The options-based series is noisy, day-by-day, and the inflation uncertainty measure exhibits 
the periodic pattern noted above as the forecast horizon varies between one and four quarters, 
nevertheless some broad conclusions are clear.  After the initial credibility-gaining period, the 
general level of SEF inflation uncertainty is closest to that of the six-month horizon interest 
rate uncertainty, but the lead-time effect is much more pronounced in the interest rate 
uncertainty series.  The three-month-ahead series generally lies below the inflation 
uncertainty series, including its troughs which correspond to the comparable one-quarter 
horizon. And the twelve-month interest rate series is well above the inflation uncertainty 
series, including its peaks which mostly correspond to the four-quarter horizon.  The 
amplitude of fluctuations in the individual interest rate series is also much greater, and their 
most important movements are not reflected in the inflation uncertainty series, nor vice versa.  
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Clews et al. (2000) draw attention to the large rise in financial market uncertainty during the 
period of turbulence in late summer and autumn 1998, but this has little effect on forecasters’ 
inflation uncertainty, as noted for the annual series in the preceding section.  Similarly, the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 appear to have increased financial market uncertainty 
but not inflation uncertainty.  The fall in inflation uncertainty associated with the change of 
monetary policy regime in 1997 gathered pace during 1998, whereas the interest rate options-
based series suggest that the financial markets saw little impact on interest rate uncertainty of 
the change in arrangements for setting the official rate. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Access to the individual responses to the Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters 
allows the construction of direct measures of forecasters’ uncertainty and disagreement, since 
the survey includes questions about the probabilities of possible future outcomes as well as 
questions about their expected values.  In this respect the survey matches the long-running 
Survey of Professional Forecasters in the United States, and its availability offers the prospect 
of a range of studies to extend a literature which has hitherto been entirely based on the SPF 
data.  This article makes a start on that agenda, by constructing relevant measures and 
studying their behaviour, in relation to the macroeconomic environment, to the SPF, and to 
other domestic measures, while many questions remain to be explored. 
 
 An aggregate measure of uncertainty defined as a measure of dispersion of an 
aggregate probability distribution includes the effect of disagreement among point forecasts, 
hence the published aggregate density forecasts are inadequate indicators of uncertainty, 
unless an allowance for disagreement is made.  A preferable measure of collective 
uncertainty can be constructed from the individual density forecasts as an aggregation of 
individual measures of dispersion, and this is implemented in respect of forecasts of inflation 
and GDP growth.  In the absence of such a direct measure of uncertainty it is sometimes 
suggested that a measure of disagreement be used instead, but our evidence indicates that this 
is not an adequate substitute, at least during what has been a relatively stable period for both 
inflation and GDP growth. 
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 The main economic event of the last ten years reflected in these measures is the new 
Labour government’s adoption in 1997 of a monetary policy of inflation targeting by a 
central bank granted operational independence for the purpose.  This was followed by a 
reduction in our measure of inflation uncertainty, to a level which is lower than that in the 
United States and which has been remarkably undisturbed since the turn of the century.  
Movements in options-implied interest rate uncertainty have no counterparts in inflation 
forecast uncertainty, whose lack of movement emphasises the secure anchoring of inflation 
expectations by a credible monetary policy. 
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Table 1.   Divergences between point forecasts and density forecast means 
 
    Percentage of cases (across all individuals and time periods) in which the point 
    forecast lies above (below) the density forecast mean by more than 0.2  
    percentage points 
 
 
          Inflation        GDP growth 
 above below above below 
Question 1 6.2 11.5 27.4 8.8 
     
Question 2 10.2 14.1 44.2 6.6 
     
Question 3 9.4 9.8 46.6 4.6 
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Figure 1.  Alternative measures of disagreement: qsds of density forecast means and point 
forecasts, question 1 
 
point forecasts density forecast means 
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Figure 2.  Measures of uncertainty and disagreement 
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Figure 3.  Fixed-event forecasts: variation of uncertainty and disagreement with forecast horizon
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Figure 4.  Disagreement about inflation uncertainty 
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Figure 5.  Uncertainty, MPC and SEF, 1996Q4-2005Q4 
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Figure 6.  Uncertainty (implied RMSV) and disagreement (qsd), US and UK 
US:disagreement UK:disagreementUK:uncertaintyUS:uncertainty
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Figure 7.  SEF inflation uncertainty (quarterly) and option-implied interest rate uncertainty (daily) 
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